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Merricks: Joint Estates in Real Property in West Virginia

JOINT ESTATES IN REAL PROPERTY IN WEST VIRGINIA
ROBERT L. MEaunCs*

THE extensive

increase in home ownership, fostered by recent
liberal money lending policies, including low down payments

on loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration immediately prior to World War II, and continued after the war by
similar policies promoted by both the FHA and the Veterans
Administration, has resulted in the reappearance of joint estates,
created by deed, particularly between husband and wife. Prior to
the depression years of the 1930's, title to the great majority of
owner-occupied real estate was vested in either the husband or the
wife, seldom in both. Where the title was vested in both, without
more, the general opinion of the bar and bench was that they held
as tenants in common.1 With the recent rise in home ownership, has
come more joint ownership of the home property by spouses.
Perhaps the economic liberation of women, occasioned by more
wives receiving money wages, has been an important factor. At
any rate, lawyers practicing in the field of real property now estimate
that about 90% of the deeds written in the more populous counties
of this state, conveying real property for use as a home, are made
to both husband and wife, and about 90% of such deeds contain
some sort of language, creating or attempting to create some kind
of survivorship between such husband and wife. The purpose of
the use of survivorship language seems to be, primarily, to keep
the real estate from passing to infant children in the event of the
intestate death of one of the parents. Such use of survivorship
language is a poor substitute for a will, but most practitioners realize
that the percentage of married persons, in the average middle range
of economic circumstances, who have executed wills, remains low.
Hence the use of joint estates with survivorship has grown.
"Member of the Kanawha County bar.
'The

West Virginia Supreme Court and bar seemingly ignored the case

of MeNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1902),
wherein it was held that a conveyance to husband and wife created a joint
tenancy, not a tenancy in common. See Edwards v. Edwards, 117 W. Va. 505,
185 S.E. 904 (1936), and Coffman v. Coffman, 108 W. Va. 285, 150 S.E. 744
(1929), wherein the deeds evidently were to husband and wife, without
more. In each case, no mention was made of the McNeeley case or its holdings. Since the joint tenancy in the McNeeley case is without survivorship,
the effect is practically the same as a tenancy in common between husband
and wife. W. VA. CoDE ch. 36, art. 1, § 19 (Michie 1955). See also syllabus 1,
Wartenburg v. Wartenburg, 100 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1957).
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The tremendous surge in the use of such estates in West Virginia has resulted in a great deal of confusion among attorneys, in
drafting deeds, as to just what type of estate to create, and, after
its creation, as to what incidents can be attributed to the estate so
created. The recent case of Wartenburg v. Wartenburg2 is an example.
This was a case of a husband seeking partition of two jointlyowned parcels of land. Two separate tenancies are dealt with.
One deed, dated August 26, 1948, created a joint life estate. The
other deed dated June 19, 1948, created a joint tenancy. The circuit
court fell into the usual confusion and held that both deeds created
estates by the entireties; "the parties 'being husband and wife, took
an estate by the entireties in the property conveyed."' Partition was
denied. The supreme court stated, "no contention is made and we
perceive no presently material difference or effect, as to the meaning
of the language used in the respective deeds." The court held that
both were joint tenancies, and partition was allowed. Neither tenancy was a tenancy by the entireties, but the court, in syllabus 1,
stated that common law estates by the entirety have been abolished.
We have no quarrel with the holding of the Wartenburg case; partition is permitted by statute in a joint tenancy, and the case of
Bush v. Ralphsnyder3 holds that a life tenant may compel partition
in a joint life estate.
This article is concerned only with real property. Different rules
have been applied in many cases dealing with survivorship in jointlyowned personal property.
There are four general types of real property joint estates, having incidences of survivorship:
Type 1. A joint life estate; e.g., to A and B (or A, B and C,
etc.,) for life with remainder to the survivor.
Type 2. Tenancy in common, with survivorship; e.g., to A and
B (or A, B, C, etc.) as tenants in common, with survivorship.
Type 8. Joint tenancy; e.g., to A and B (or A, B, C, etc.) as
joint tenants with survivorship, and not as tenants in common.
Type 4. Tenancy by the entireties; e.g., to H and W as tenants
by the entireties, with survivorship.
For convenience, these types will be referred to by type
numbers.
2 100 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1957).
3 100 S.E.2d 484, 130 S.E. 807 (1926).
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Although we are here dealing primarily with joint estates between husband and wife, the tenancies in types 1, 2 and 3 may be
between A and B, not husband and wife, or between A, B, C, etc.,
ad infinitum. In types 1 and 2, the interest of A in the real property
does not have to be the same'as B, e.g., A may own / and B Y4 or
A may own %, B 4 and C Y4. In type 8, the interests have to be
the same, no matter how many tenants. Only in type 4 is the tenancy
limited to a husband and a wife, and no more.
The common law incidents of these estates will be considered
in order to understand them as they exist today in West Virginia,
limited and altered by statute and by decisions of our supreme
court.
In all four types, it is the generally accepted rule that the survivor takes the whole of the real property, 4 and it is also generally
accepted that any cotenant may convey his interest to any other
cotenant. Such a conveyance to a cotenant terminates his own interest in the real property, including his right to take as a survivor in
5
type 2, 3 and 4 tenancies.
4An exception is the case of murder of one tenant by another, holding
that the survivor could not profit by his illegal act. Bradley v. Fox, 7 M11.
2d
106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
5 1 MINOR, REAL PRtOPERTY § 908 (1908),

citing 2 MINoR, INsTirIEs

471 (1875), reads:
"It is one of the incidents of a joint tenancy, as we have seen that
while the tenants hold per mie et per tout, yet each may convey to a
cotenant or to a stranger a distinctshare.
"In this respect, the tenancy by the entireties differs radically from
an ordinary joint tenancy. While the husband at common law, under his
ordinary marital right of disposing of and managing his wife's lands during the coverture, might during the coverture control and dispose of his
wife's share of the land held by entireties, yet with this exception, in consequence of their legal oneness, neither can dispose absolutely even of his
or her own part of the property without the other's assent, but the whole
remains at common law to the survivor.
We can hardly conceive of a case where the receiving spouse would refuse his consent, actual or implied, by acceptance of the conveyance. 2 MINoR,
IiTrrrr rs 471, 472 (1875), contains only the following pertinent language:
"It would seem that even now, in case of a tenancy by entireties, the parties
cannot separately aliene their respective shares."
The word "aliene'" as used here, would indicate a conveyance to a
stranger, not to a spouse cotenant. 26 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 257
(1940): 0he
view has been taken that one spouse can
convey or transfer to
the other spouse the former's interest in an estate held by them by the
entireties so as to relinquish his or her rights in such estate and vest it as a
separate estate in the grantee or transferee, and this has been held to be
true even in jurisdictions where neither spouse can convey or transfer any
interest in such an estate without the consent of the other, the theory
being that such consent is to be implied from the grantee or transferee
spouseIs acceptance of the conveyance or transfer."
See also Bunco v. Ostroski, 361 Pa. 593, 65 A.2d 399, 8 A.L.R.2d 630-639
(1949).
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A careful analysis of each type of estate, not generally done by
the courts or lawyers, shows that each has separate incidents, particularly during the lifetime of the tenants.

Type 1, a joint life estate, was formerly in general use, in some
parts of this state, but a question was raised as to where the title
would vest, in the event both life tenants were killed simultaneously
in a common accident or disaster; in view of the possibility that the
title might revert, in such event, back to the grantor, the use of this
6
type was generally abandoned.

Type 2, a tenancy in common, with survivorship, is not in general use in this jurisdiction. In the opinion of this writer, this type
of survivorship is created by the language, "to A and B, and to the
survivor of them," which language has been sometimes used in deeds
7
in this jurisdiction.

The large majority of deeds containing survivorship clauses,
use language to create type 3, a joint tenancy. This is often confused
with type 4, an estate by the entireties; some courts misdescribe the
type 4 tenancy as a joint tenancy by the entireties. Actually, at
common law, the two estates were very different, with dissimilar
incidents and characteristics, both while the tenants were living
and after their death.
The main incidents of a joint tenancy, one of the estates in the
Wartenburg case, are that the estate has the four common law
unities, of time, title, interest and possession. Breach of any one of
6The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, adopted in 1958, W. VA. CODE
ch. 42, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1955), eliminates the possibility of reverter in the

type 1, joint life estate tenancy.
7Some authorities hold that one tenant in a type 2 tenancy in common
with survivorship cannot convey his undivided interest away and thereby
defeat the survivorship. See Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 496, 144 AUt. 848,
852, 67 A.L.R. 1051 (1929), wherein it is stated:
"But there is obviously a very great distinction between the limitation of survivorship that is involved in a gift of joint tenancy, and the
limitation of the word 'survivor' which is annexed to a tenancy in common. The survivorship involved in an estate in joint tenancy is that which
is capable of being defeated at the pleasure of the joint tenant, so that if,
by alienation or otherwise, the joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy
in common, the survivorship ceases; but when a gift to the 'survivor' is
annexed to a tenancy in common and not to a joint tenancy, then the
Rimitation takes effect by virtue of the gift, and not by virtue of something involved in a limitation of joint tenancy. Taaffe v. Conmee, 10
H. L. Cas. 64, 78. Such a provision creates life estates, with cross
remainders."
We submit that such construction violates the intent of the parties to create a
tenancy in common, with an added feature of survivorship. "The right of
survivorship may be annexed to a tenancy in common if the parties so intend."
4 THo VrsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1786 (perm. ed. 1940). See also § 1790.
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these unities results in the destruction of the joint tenancy.8 It may
exist between two or more tenants, not necessarily husband and wife.
A conveyance to two or more persons, not husband and wife, at
common law, created a joint tenancy. 9 It may be destroyed by any
tenant attorning (conveying) to a stranger, which destroys the
unity of title, thereby breaching the tenancy as to the particular
tenant who does the attorning. A, B and C hold as joint tenants. A
attorns to a stranger. B and C continue as joint tenants, as between
themselves, including the right of survivorship, but the stranger
holds as tenant in common, without survivorship, with B and C.10
It likewise may be destroyed by collateral attack on the interest of
one tenant, by a creditor, by levy, attachment and sale.' Dower
does not exist in this type 3 joint tenancy. 12
Type 4, tenancy by the entireties, has the same four unities,
plus a fifth unity, of persons; it only exists where the tenants are
husband and wife.' 3
"By common law land conveyed simply to a husband and
wife did not, as in the case of a conveyance to two persons, not
husband and wife, creates [sic] a joint tenancy, but an estate by
entirety. 'It is a sole, not a joint tenancy. Each holds the
entirety. They are one in law, and their estate one and indivisible.
"'If the husband alien, if he suffer a recovery, if he be
attainted, none of these will effect [sic] the wife, if she survive
him.
"'Nor is this by the jus accrescendi. There is no such thing
between them. That takes place where, by the death of one
joint tenant, the survivor receives an accession, something which
he had not before, the right of the deceased. But the husband
and wife have the whole, from the moment of conveyance to
them, and the death of either cannot give the survivor more.'
This statement of the nature of this ancient estate in land,
dating far back in time, in Thornton4 v. Thornton, 3 Rand. 179,
is supported by all the authorities.'
8 2 MiNoi, INsTnTmS 468.
9 See note 5 supra.
10 4 THompsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1780.
1i Id. §§ 1776-1788. For a general description of type 3, joint tenancy, see

41 C..S.Husband and Wife § 83 (1944).

12 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1778; Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. 505,

39 S.E.2d 299 (1946).
13 4 THOMvsoN, REA PROPERTz § 1804. This fifth unity is described in
26 Am. Jun. Husband and Wife § 71 (1940), as the husband and wife unity
of ownership.
14 This same quotation appears in 4 TuoMwsoN, REAL POPERTY 882.
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"No partition, voluntary or involuntary, can be made between husband and wife of such an estate. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency.
Law 49; 2 Minor 471.15 One dying, the survivor gets the
whole. In such land the husband had, at least, an estate for his
life, and if he outlived his wife, he simply retained the whole.
His conveyance of the whole would operate to confer on his
grantee an estate during his
16 life, and if he survived, it would
pass the fee to the whole."
The common law basis for the estate by the entireties was the
legal fiction that husband and wife were one person; at common
law, there could be no moieties between them. Neither party holds
a separate interest, the definition of the estate being per tout et non
per my. Being one person, they could not be joint tenants or tenants
17
in common, as these tenancies require more than one tenant.
As noted in the above citation from the McNeeley case, this
type 4 tenancy is not subject to collateral attack and it cannot be
destroyed by either party conveying to a stranger, but it can be
destroyed by a divorce between the parties; after divorce, H and W
hold as tenants in common.' 8 The source of the consideration for
purchase of the property, is immaterial. 19
Some cases hold that a tenancy by the entireties and a joint
tenancy are exactly alike except that the former has the additional
unity of marriage relation. In our opinion, these cases represent
fuzzy legal thinking. One particular characteristic shows that there
is a considerable difference between the two estates; a joint tenancy
25 See note 5 supra; the authorities cited do not support the proposition
that the husband and wife cannot voluntarily partition the estate.
16 McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 620-621, 44 S.E. 508,
509 (1902). For more definition of the type 4 tenancy, see 41 C.J.S.

Husband and Wife § 34 (1944).
1741 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 31 (1944).
1827 C.J.S. Divorce § 180 (1941).

Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259

Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685, 52 A.L.R. 886 (1927). "The weight of authority is

that a decree of divorce severs an estate by the entireties and makes the
divorced spouses tenants in common." At 890. The divorce destroys the unity
of persons in the type 4 estate. Once destroyed, the question arises as to
whether the estate is reduced to a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common. "Joint
tenancy and its doctrine of survivorship are not in harmony with the genius of
our institutions, nor are they much favored at law." Consequently, the result,
in a common law type 4 tenancy is that a divorce reduces the estate to a
tenancy in common.
•
Quaere, where the estate is created by expressed intent, using language
"to H and IV, as tenants by the entireties, with survivorship," will the courts
carry out the intent and continue the survivorship, even though the tenants
are divorced? Divorce does not affect a joint tenancy, or its survivorship. 27
C.J.S. Divorce § 180 (1941). See also Annot. 59 A.L.R. 718 (1929). See
discussion in 26 A3& Jtm. Husband and Wife § 117 (1940), noting a split of
authorities on the point. See also 4 THOmPSON, R.i
PROPERTY § 1814.
19 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 31 (1944).
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may be destroyed by a collateral attack. Another characteristic is
that one tenant by the entireties cannot compel partition, while partition between joint tenants is generally recognized not only by
statute in West Virginia 20 but in most other states. 2 ' As noted
herein, there are numerous other differences.
Both estates, type 8 joint tenancy and type 4 tenancy by the
entireties, existed at common law in Virginia, prior to the formation
of our state in 1868.
Survivorship in joint tenancies was abolished as early as July 1,
1787, but this act was held to have no application to tenants by the
entireties. Survivorship between tenants by the entireties continued
in Virginia as at common law until July 1, 1850, when it was partially
abolished.
"'And if hereafter an estate of inheritance be conveyed or
devised to a husband and his wife, one moiety of such estate
shall on the death of either, descend to his or her22 heirs subject to
debts, curtesy or dower, as the case may be."'
The present West Virginia statute, successor to the above
quoted section of the Virginia Code of 1849, reads as follows:
"When any joint tenant or tenant by the entireties of an
interest in real or personal property, whether such interest be a
present interest, or by way of reversion or remainder or other
or be disposed
future interest, shall die, his share shall descend
23
of as if he had been a tenant in common."
Note that neither the Virginia Code of 1849, nor the present
West Virginia Code actually abolishes the type 4 tenancy; both
merely remove the survivorship feature at death. During coverture,
the estate continued with all of its incidents, until emaciated by the
married women's acts in this state. Virginia, by enactment in its
Code of 1887, abolished the estate ab initio, by providing that immediately upon creation, it is reduced to a tenancy in common.
The said Virginia statute reads in part as follows:
"And if hereafter any estate, real or personal, be conveyed
or devised to a husband and his wife, they shall take and hold
moiety had
the same by moieties, in like manner as if a distinct
24
been given to each by a separate conveyance."
ch. 87, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1955).
See 41 C.J.S. 457 (1944) for more differences between type 8 and
type 242 tenancies.
VA. CODE cl. 116, § 18 (1849); Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 789, 149 S.E.
615 (1929).
23 W. VA. CODE oh. 86, art. 1, § 19 (Michie 1955).
24
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1950).
20 W. VA. CODE
21
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Judge Brannon, in the McNeeley case, sounded the death knell
to the common law estate in this jurisdiction; syllabus 2 of the
McNeeley case reads:
"Survivorship in estates by entirety was abolished 1st July,
1859, by §18, Chapter 116, Virginia Code 1849, continued in
the West Virginia Code of 1868, Chapter 71, § 18."
Syllabus 5 of the McNeeley case reads:
"The conveyance of land to husband and wife since 1st
April, 1869, does not create an estate by entirety, but a joint
tenancy, and the wife's interest is separate estate. The joint
effect of section 18, chapter 71, abolishing survivorship in
estates by entirety, and of chapter 66, relating to separate
estate of married women, of Code of 1868, is to abolish estates
by entirety. The husband is not entitled to sole posession during coverture, but has curtesy in his wife's half after her death."
Although, in our opinion, this syllabus is not supported by
25
authorities, "the syllabus is the law."
This McNeeley case has been widely cited for the proposition
that it abolishes type 4 tenancies in our state.2 6 Most jurisdictions
take the opposite view, that estates by the entirety are not abolished
by married women's statutes.
"The only effect which a married women's statute, providing that the property of a married woman shall be her sole
and separate property free from the control of her husband, has
upon tenants by the entireties, is to deny the husband, during
law, to
marriage, the right, which he formerly had at common
27
the exclusive possession and control of the property."
Can a type 4 tenancy by the entireties, or any of the other
types, be created in this state by intent expressed in a deed? We
think so.
Under the common law, a conveyance to husband and wife,
whether described in the deed as tenants in common or as joint
tenants, vested an estate in them as tenants by the entireties. 28 Some
courts still hold to this rule, and pay no attention to the expressed
intent of the grantor, 29 creating types 1, 2 or 3 tenancies. This is an
archaic view to take in these modem times of married women's
independence and of separate estate acts, existing in practically all
25

See Hardman, "The Law"-in West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 141,

209 (1940-41).

26 26 Am. Jntr. Husband and Wife § 67 (1950).
27 Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354, 141 A.L.R. 170-204
(1942).
28
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 457, 466 (1946).
29
E.g., the circuit court in the Wartenburg case.
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of the forty-eight states. The substantial number of cases holding
that a tenancy by the entireties is created by a deed to husband
and wife, no matter what type of estate is expressly intended to be
created, are flagrant violations of the rules of construction and of
intent of the parties.
Our court has not held to the theory that any deed to husband
and wife creates a type 4 tenancy. The West Virginia court has
followed the doctrine of the McNeeley case, without citing it, in at
least two later cases concerning deeds to husband and wife, without
expression of intent as to what estate was to be created. These are
Coffman v. Coffman 3 and Edwards v. Edwards.3 1 Although neither
case sets forth the exact language of the deed conveying the property in question to the husband and wife, evidently the deeds were
merely to husband and wife, without more. As above noted at common law, such a conveyance ordinarily created a tenancy by the
entireties, in the absence of contrary intent expressed. 3 2 The Coffman
case involved partition between husband and wife. Without referring to the McNeeley case, the West Virginia court did not think
that a conveyance to husband and wife created a tenancy by the
entireties; partition was allowed. "And it is held that partition cannot be made between tenants by the entirety."33 The West Virginia
Code does not permit partition between tenants by the entireties
but only between joint tenants, coparcenors and tenants in common. 34 The Edwards case allowed an accounting between husband
and wife; no mention was made of an estate by the entireties, or
of the McNeeley case.
Another case illustrating that our court did not favor tenancies
by the entireties, is that of Carterv. Carter.35 In that case, the deed
was to Angus R.Carter, Jr., and Elah Carter, his wife, as joint owners, the deed containing the further provision:
"It is expressly understood that if the said Angus R.Carter,
Jr., should die before his wife, Elah Carter, dies, that then the
entire estate in and to the said property shall be and become the
sole property of the said Elah Carter; that if the said Elah
Carter should die before her husband, Angus R. Carter, Jr.,
285, 150 S.E. 744 (1929). See note 1 supra.
117 W. Va. 505, 185 S.E. 904 (1930)'. See note 1 supra.
32 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 31 (1944).
30 108 W. Va.
31

33 14

MicHIE Jun. 140 (1951); 68 C.J.S. Partition § 28 (1950); 26 Am.
Partition was also the problem in the

Junt. Husband and Wife § 66 (1940).

Wartenburgcase.

CODE ch. 37, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1955).
s5 87 W. Va. 254, 104 S.E. 552 (1920).
84W.VA.
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should die then the entire estate in fee simple in and to the
said property, should be and become the sole property of the
said Angus R. Carter, Jr."
Without citing the McNeeley case the court held that the said
language created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In most
other jurisdictions, the said language clearly would have created a
tenancy by the entireties.
These cases indicate that our court's thinking, without reference to the McNeeley case, was away from the strict rule that any
conveyance to husband and wife, created a type 4 tenancy, long
before the present surge in survivorship usage started. The court
was thus following the rule of the intent of the parties, not to create
a type 4 tenancy, unless expressly intended. However, nothing in
any of these cases opposes the express intentional creation of the
type 4 estate by the entireties.
The intent of the parties is controlling as to what estate is
created. 36 In the case of Davidson v. Eubanks, 37 a Missouri case
in a jurisdiction where the common law tenancy by the entireties
still exists, language in the caption or premises of deed, following
the names of the grantees, stating "as tenants in common," was held
to be sufficient indication of intent to create what it said, a tenancy
in common. Note that the language "as tenants in common," was
not in the granting clause, and it was not in a habendum clause,
but was only in the caption of the deed.
To the same effect, see syllabus 2, in the West Virginia case of
Irvin v. Stover:
"In construing deeds, as well as wills, the purpose is to
ascertain the intention of the parties and when the intention is
thus ascertained it will be effectuated, unless it contravenes
some principle of law."38
Young v. Cockman, a Maryland case, states the matter of intent, as follows:
"A conveyance to a husband and wife will ordinarily
create a tenancy by entirety but an intention clearly expressed
in the instrument that they shall take
39 as joint tenants or
as tenants in common will be effective."
3

6Amiot, 161 A.L.R. 457 (1946).

37 354 Mo. 301, 189 S.W.2d 295, 161 A.L.R. 450 (1945).
38 67 W. Va. 356, 67 S.E. 1119 (1910).
39 182 Md. 246, 84 A.2d 428 (1943), 149 A.L.R. 1006 (1944). Emphasis

added.
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Professor Minor notes the same thing, in writing about the
common law fiction of husband and wife "constituting but one
person at law. When land is conveyed to them, after marriage, not
expressly to hold as tenants in common, they are said to be seized
by entireties."40 An expressed intention would create a tenancy in
common.
"While a conveyance or devise to a husband and wife will
ordinarily create a tenancy by the entireties, the authorities are
generally to the effect that an intention, clearly expressed in
the instrument, that they will take as tenants in common or
joint tenants, will be effective." 4 1
Allen v. Parkey,42 often cited to the effect that type 4 tenancies
are abolished, holds that the intent of the parties controls. Construing a Virginia statute containing the very same wording as the
West Virginia Code, the Virginia court held that the parties created
a type 4 tenancy by the entireties, by specific language, and partition was denied.4 3 The West Virginia Code carries this intent into
effect. This code section, which needs to be read with the preceding
section, is as follows:
"When Survivorship Preserved. The preceding section
shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to an estate conveyed or devised to persons,
in their own right, when it manifestly appears from the tenor of
the instrument that it was intended that the part of the one
dying should then belong to the others. Neither shall it affect the
mode of the proceeding on any joint judgment or decree in
favor 44of, or on any contract with, two or more, one of whom
dies."
This section preserves the rights of the parties to create, intention45
ally, any type of survivorship they desire.
402 MINOR, INSTrruTES 466 (1875).
411 TrArNY, REAL :normvry 646 (2d ed. 1920).

154 Va. 789, 149 S.E. 615 (1929).
SBurroughs v. Gorman, 166 Va. 58, 184 S.E. 174 (196), where the
grant was to H and W, "to be owned and held by them as joint tenants, with
the common law right of survivorship." The Virginia court, construing VA.
CODE § 5160 (1919), which is identical with W. VA. CODE ch. 86, art. 1, § 20
(Michie 1955), held that the intent controlled and that the grantees held 'under
a type 8 joint tenancy.
44W. VA. CODE ch. 86, art. 1, § 20 (Michie 1955).
42
4

45 26

Am. JuR. Husband and Wife § 87 (1950): "According to the trends

of modern authority .... husband and wife may, in jurisdictions which recognize their right to take and hold property as tenants by the entireties, become
joint tenants or tenants in common in property conveyed or given to them
during marriage, provided, according to some courts, the instruments of title
by appropriate words dearly indicates an intention to make them joint tenants
or tenants in common, and not tenants by the entireties."
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The law is aptly stated in the Virginia case of Vasilou v. Vasi/ou.46 The deed was made to husband and wife "as tenants by the
entireties, with right of survivorship as at common law." Wife and
husband joined in a deed conveying to wife. A creditor of husband
brought suit to set aside the deed to wife as a fraudulent conveyance and to require partition. The court held that the deed created
what it intended, a common law tenancy by the entireties, under the
Virginia Code, which is identical with the West Virginia statute,
and that a creditor of husband, alone, could not attack it. Therefore, the deed to wife was not in fraud of husband's creditors, and
partition was denied. The Virginia court, in a well-written opinion
goes into the history of the statutes abolishing the common law
type 4 tenancy, and the line of Virginia cases interpreting the statutes.
Although the West Virginia court has not yet ruled on a case
involving an expressly created tenancy by the entireties we cannot
see how the court, in a properly presented case, could refuse to
follow the weight of authority, including the Vasilou case, and give
to this code section its clear meaning, thus sustaining an estate by
the entireties where one was intended. Our court should follow
the same rules of intent as to types 1, 2 and 8 tenancies, although in
the Wartenburg case it failed to note that the first deed contained
only a type 1 tenancy.
No particular technical language is required to create a survivorship between the tenants. The use of the word "jointly", or a
grant to two or more persons "and the survivor", has been held
sufficient. 47 The language expressing intent does not need to be
in the granting clause; "and to the survivor of her" in a habendum
has been held sufficient.48 The language in the Carter case did not
use the word "survivor," but it was held to create a joint tenancy
with survivorship.
A will is construed in Neal v. Hamilton Co., reading as follows:
"Fourth. After the death of my wife Adaline, I will and
bequeath unto my two sons James L. Neal and John Neal the
Farm I now live on to be equally divided between the two
above named sons. The above request includes both tracts
of land I now own....
192, Va. 785, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
aorEmarY § 1790.
Realty Securities & Discount Co. v. National Rubber & Leather Co.,
122 W. Va. 21, 7 S.E.2d 49 (1940).
46

47 4 THoMsoN, REAL
48
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"Sixth. In case of the death of either of my sons above
named, I will and bequeath that the remaining son living shall
have and hold in his own right the whole of the above named
bounded two tracts of land."49
The court held that the two sons took "a joint remainder in fee
simple, subject to the right of survivorship."
"The donor or testator must make plain his purpose, but
when that purpose has been made plain and it is manifest that
he intended survivorship should follow, the court will give
effect to this intention, and no particular words are necessary."5 0
"The right of survivorship exists wherever it is manifest
that a grantor or testator so desired and makes plain his purpose. Indeed the statute in express terms so declares."51
Although survivorship is the most important feature of these
joint estates, the incidences during the lives of the tenants are also
important. It is necessary for an attorney to create a particular
estate, and to know the advantages and disadvantages of such estate.
We suggest the use of the following language to create each
of the four types:
Type 1: Grant to A and B (or A, B, C, etc.), for and during
their natural lives, with remainder to the survivor of them.
Type 2: Grant to A and B (or A, B,C, etc.), as tenants in
common with survivorship.
Type 3: Grant to A and B (or A, B, C, etc.), as joint tenants
with survivorship.
Type 4: Grant to H and W, as tenants by the entireties, with
survivorship.
The practitioner is confronted with the problem of which type
to use. As noted above, type 3 is in general use. Many attorneys
favor type 4. Some objection has been raised that type 4 is an
implied fraud upon the husband's creditors because they cannot
attach his interest in it,
credit often being extended to the husband
on the strength of his material possession of a home. In our opinion
this argument has no merit. Any creditor, with a slight amount of
effort can check the conveyance in the nearby county clerk's office
and determine that a debtor's home is held in a type 4 tenancy. Many
4970 W. Va. 251, 73 S.E. 971 (1912).
50
5 Mrcm JuR. Cotenancy § 4 (1949).
51Walace v. WaUace, 168 Va. 216, 190

S.E. 293 (1937), construing the
Vir~hnia statute with language Identical to W. VA. CoDE ch. 36, art 1,§ 20
(Michie 1955).
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business men and others, realizing the continuing possibility of
personal loss, place the title to their home in the name of their wife
only. This places the home out of reach of the husband's general
creditors just as effectively as a type 4 tenancy. The use of type 4
can keep the family home free from the results of improvident acts
by either husband or wife, acting separately.
Another objection to the creation of a type 4 estate by specific
intentional conveyance, is that all of the common law limitations
on the wife would attach to the estate.
"Subject to survivorship, the husband 'is entitled during
coverture to the full control and usufruct of the land to the
exclusion of the wife, and has, according to the weight of authorities the power to sell, mortgage, or lease for the same
period, and his life interest is subject to the claims of creditors.'
15 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 849."52
In a. few states it has been held that women's separate estate
acts abolish the type 4 tenancy, because they are designed to do
away with the legal rule that as to property, man and wife are one.
"But it will be found that the very decided weight of
authority from other states is to the effect that the married
woman's act do not abolish estates by entirety. Our own act
comes from New York, and there the holding has been that it
was not the effect of the section, and plainly was not its purpose, to change the force and operation of a conveyance to a
wife. It does not enlarge the estate which a wife would otherwise take in land conveyed to her, and whatever the effect of a
conveyance to a husband and wife was, prior to that statute,
so it remains. If the operation of such conveyance was to pass
the entire estate to each of the grantees, so that each became
seized of the entirety, there is nothing in the force or effect of
the language used to change the operation of such a deed as
to make the grantees tenants in common. The section gives
the wife no greater right to receive conveyances than she had
at common law, but its sole purpose was to secure to her during coverture, what she did not have at common law, the use,
and the right to conbenefit and control of her own real5 estate,
3
vey and devise it as if unmarried."
Since the women's separate estate acts5 4 as above noted, remove
the husband's sole control in a type 4 tenancy, the common law
limitations on a wife's property in the type 4 estate no longer exist.
5
2 MaNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 626, 44 S.E. 508, 511
(1902).
5 id. at 627, 44 S.E. at 512.
54W. VA. Con3 ch. 48, dit. 3, §§ 1-24 (Michie 19W5), is the modem
version of the women's separate estate acts in West Virginia.
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Incidents of a tenancy by the entireties that remain today, when
the estate is created by express language, thus would seem to be few.
Survivorship upon death is the most important remaining incident.
Indivisibility and impartibility have not been lost although Judge
Brannon in the McNeeley case, after noting that survivorship has
perished under the Code of 1850, and that the rights of husband
to control and take profits of and convey for his life, the interest
of the wife, have been taken away by the separate estate act, states,
"What is left of an estate by entirety? Is its indivisibility
or impartibility still left? I think not, as I think the statute
of partition applies to it"55
However, the good judge cited no authority for his thoughts
and we have found none. The statute of partition includes only
"tenants in common, joint tenants and coparceners of real property." 56 Consequently, we can only conclude that an estate by the
entireties is still impartible and indivisible, except by the act of one
57
tenant conveying to the other.
Another factor in determining what type of tenancy to use is
the necessity for administration of the estate of a deceased tenant,
particularly where the only property owned at the date of death
is real estate held in a type 3 or type 4 tenancy. Some attorneys in
this jurisdiction are of the opinion that the decedent's debts do not
attach to property passing to the survivor under a type 3 joint tenancy; others are of the opinion that decedent's creditor's rights are
not barred, and hence administration of decedent's estate, held in
type 3, joint tenancy, is necessary. We have found no decisions in
this jurisdiction. Since the deceased tenant's debts do not attach to
his interest passing to the survivor of a type 4 tenancy by the entireties, it is generally accepted that no administration of the decedent's estate is necessary. In type 4, the decedent had no separate
estate; his creditors had no rights prior to his death to attach his
interest in the tenancy, and his death gave them nothing new.
Tax matters, not here considered, also have a bearing on the
type of tenancy to use in a particular factual situation. One type
may fit the case of a husband and wife with few assets, and another type may be the best for a millionaire couple, where the
1 52 W. Va. at 629, 44 S.E. at 512.

36W. VA. CoDE ch. 37, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1955).
67141 A.L.R. 201, 204 (1942). In some jurisdictions the removal of the

wife's disability under married women's acts has been held to abolish all of
the incidents ofa type 4 tenancy.
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benefits of the estate tax marital exemption may be desired. As
above noted, the use of wills for both husband and wife, will, from
a practical standpoint, eliminate the problems of survivorship in a
specific case. But in the absence of wills, the practitioner should
create a specific type of estate, suited to the facts at hand.
[An article on the tax aspects of joint ownership, by Charles B.
Stacy, Esq., of the Kanawha County bar, will appear in the April
issue of the Law Review. Ed.]
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